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Abstract
Statutory scal depreciation of real estates is typically higher than their realistic ex-
pected life. This would imply that markets would value buildings more than their social
fundamental value. I prove that this allows house price bubbles to emerge and open the
door to sudden crashes, even in an economy with fully rational and forward-looking in-
dividuals, and no credit market imperfections. I also provide a simple "rule-of-thumb"
method to calculate the highest bubble-free depreciation rate. With standard parame-
ters, it turns out that the usual annual 5% scal depreciation can prevent house price
bubbles only by a very close shave.
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"A lot of my write-o¤ was depreciation..I pay tax and I pay federal tax too. But I have
a write-o¤, a lot of it is depreciation, which is a wonderful charge. I love depreciation."
Donald Trump, October 9, 2016.
1 Introduction
When a rm buys a building it is entitled to deduct parts of its value from taxes at rates
which are supposed to approximate the actual economic depreciation rate of the building.
However scal schedules are often the result of political compromise and sometimes accused
to be too generous to real estate holders willing to minimize their income taxes. For example,
according to the federal Modied Accelerated Cost-Recovery System (MACRS) introduced
by the US Tax Reform Act of 1986, businesses may recover investments in buildings through
depreciation deductions up to a substantial amount: typically a house is assumed to be
depreciated in 27.5 years, but the owner can opt for accelerated depreciation, so short as to
5 years. On the other hand, estimated depreciation rates for buildings are notoriously much
smaller - running from 0.36% per year (Leigh, 1980), to 2.5% per year (Harding, Rosenthal,
and Sirmans, 2007). Similarly long housing life expectancies are used in the literature - 1%
in Cocco (2005), 1.5% in Diaz and Luengo-Prago (2008), and Maggiori, Stroebel, and Weber
(2015). Hence, with the scal depreciation rules actually in place, the governments could
actually be subsidizing house prices. This paper proves theoretically that this is su¢ cient
to render a rational house price bubble sustainable. Moreover, this allows for self-fullling
prophecies to generate house price bubble collapses even in an otherwise very stable economy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple stylized house
price model. Section 3 characterizes and proves the existence of rational bubbles and sunspot
equilibria in this model. The nal section concludes.
2 A Simple Model of House Prices
Let us assume that innitely lived families - identical and with constant population normal-
ized to 1 - choose consumption, savings and investment by maximizing their intertemporal
utility functional represented by
E0
1X
j=0
j
c1 t+j   1
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where time t = 0; 1; ::: is unbounded and discrete,  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution,  = 1
1+
is the subjective discount factor, with subjective interest
rate  > 0. Individuals produce income wt per unit time. The market for interfamily
consumption loan is open, and rt is its real rate of return between period t and t+1. Family
wealth, denoted at, grows according to:
at+1 = atrt + wt   ct    t,
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where  t is percapita lump-sum taxation. We will allow the representative households in-
come, which is this economys GDP, to grow at constant exogenous rate   0.The associated
Euler equation is:
c t = Et

c t+1(1 + rt)

, (1)
where Et is the expectation as of time t.
Financial intermediaries - called "banks", and operating at zero cost - perfectly diversify
individual savings into "houses", which are in limited supply H. In every period each bank
buys a house and sells it to other banks in next period: hence the current stock of houses gets
rolled over in every period.1 We assume that the price of a house paid by a bank, pt  0, is
refunded in a fraction  2 [0; 1] per period by the government. Parameter  is exogenously
set by the legislation on the depreciation of physical investment. For simplicity, we will
assume balanced government budget, with lump sum taxes nancing the scal depreciation
of the buildings:
 t = Hpt.
Hence non-distortionary taxation is fully compensated by trasfers and do not interphere with
our assumed intertemporal wealth constraint.
I will assume for simplicity that real estates are unproductive and irreproducible assets.
Hence any positive price would be a bubble. An extension would complicate notation, but
would imply that the bubble would be the di¤erence between the price of the asset and the
expected present value of the rents it generates.2
2.1 Bubble-free Equilibrium
Our very simple economy always admits a general equilibrium without bubbles.
A bubble-free equilibrium is a sequence of consumption fctg1t=0 and real interest rates
frtg1t=0, house prices fptg1t=0, and taxes f tg1t=0, such that pt = 0 =  t, ct = wt = (1+ )tw0,
for all t = 0; 1; 2; :::, and eq. (1) holds. As a consequence, eq. (1) determines a constant real
interest rate
rt = (1 + )
 1   1  r. (2)
Hence in this simple economy the bubble-free equilibrium exists, is unique, and it is along
a balanced growth path.
2.2 Bubbly Equilibrium
In this section I will characterize the stationary rational bubble equilibrium of our simple
economy. I will now look for the possibility of bubbles with constant probability  2 [0; 1[ of
bursting each period. Since nancial intermediaries, perfectly competing and risk neutral,
view real estate investment as equivalent to consumption loans, they will invest in estates
only if the expected returns between the activities are equalized, that is only if:
1This allows banks to update their scal depreciation to higher levels during a house price bubble.
2Our model is purposefully very stylized, but it could be complicated in several directions. For a useful
survey of recent housing macroeconomics, see Piazzesi and Schneider (2016).
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pt+1(1  )
pt(1  ) = 1 + rt. (3)
Since there is a probability  of bursting each period, the probability of the bubble lasting
more than an arbitrary number T of periods is (1   )T > 0. For a housing bubble to be
stationary it is necessary that the price of the asset grows at the same rate as the real GDP
until it bursts. Hence we will look for an equilibrium in which, conditionally on the bubble
not having burst until period t, the following holds:
pt+1
pt
=

1 + , with probability , and
0, with probability 1  . (4)
This guarantees that the value of the stock of estates does not become unboundedly
higher than GDP in any state of nature.
Also in a stationary (balanced growth path) bubbly equilibrium, percapita consumption
will grow at the same rate as GDP, that is
ct+1
ct
= 1 + . (5)
Therefore, since eq. (5) and the Euler equation (1) hold simulaneously, yielding:
1 + rt = (1 + )
 (1 + ) . (6)
Combining eq.s (3), (4), and (6), provided the bubble has not burst until period t, we have:
 = 1  (1 + ) (1  )
(1 + )1 
 (; ; ; ). (7)
Notice that (; ; ; ) gives the equilibrium probability of the bubble bursting as a function
of the subjective interest rate, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the economys
growth rate, and the scal depreciation rate. From (5) we see that  is non-negative if and
only if:
  1  (1 + )
1 
1 + 
 min(; ; ). (8)
The threshold level, min, of scal depreciation for the existence of a stationary rational real
estate bubble with constant probability of exploding is positive, because the convergence
of representative agent utility restricts parameters to 1 +  > (1 + )1 . Therefore if
government forced the scal amortization rate to be low enough the real estate bubble would
not exist in this economy. Existence becomes possible only if the government allows for a
level of  at least as large as min. Interestingly, the higher  the higher the probability of
the bubble collapsing each period. Therefore we can conclude with the following:
Proposition 1. A stationary rational house price bubble equilibrium exists if and only
if the scal depreciation rate  is above a minimum level min. The higher the allowed
depreciation rate the higher the probability per year of a house price bubble crash.
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Notice that the crash probability is an example of a rational stationary sunspot equilib-
rium (Cass and Shell, 1983), that would not emerge in this economy (see, Tirole 1982) if the
government did not introduce a scal depreciation rate.
With a standard unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution traditional in real business
cycle literature,  = 1, and the canonical subjective rate of time preference  = 5%, the min-
imum yearly amortization needed to generate a bubble would be min =

1+
= 0:048. This,
according to eq. (8), predicts the possibility of a house price bubble starting, with associ-
ated probability of bursting - eq. (7) - equal to (; ; ; ) = 1  (1 + ) (1  ) = 0:00002.
Despite the simplicity of our analysis, it seems that the usual 20 years scal depreciation is
roughly borderline, and potentially able to generate a very long-lasting house price bubble.
Using instead the 5 year lower bound of MACRS would imply a house price bubble expected
to be crashing every 6 years and three months.
2.2.1 House nite lives
Our very simple framework can be extended in several realistic directions. One is to assume
that each house has a nite expected life. We can model this by assuming a positive annual
house crash rate, denoted  > 0. According to the literature,  = 0:01 is realistic, and it
implies a 100 year expected life of the house. This would modify our eq. (3) to
pt+1(1  )(1  )
pt(1  ) = 1 + rt, (9)
and, after the same steps as in the previous section, lead us to the following modied version
of eq. (7):
 = 1  (1 + ) (1  )
(1 + )1  (1  )  
(; ; ; ; ). (10)
Therefore the new expression for eq. (8) would be:
  1  (1 + )
1  (1  )
1 + 
 min(; ; ; ). (11)
Using the previous numerical example for the other parameters, we obtain min = 1  
1 
1+
= 1  99=105 = 0:0571.
Quite interestingly, our very simple numerical analysis delivers a minimum annual scal
depreciation rate required for a bubble to emerge that is slightly higher than 5% per year.
This suggests that the standard scal depreciation rate of 5% per year would be the best
rounding of the upper bound for a rational house price bubble not to emerge! According to
my simple model, it seems that legislators adopting that simple accountancy rule could have
been amazingly cautiosly generous towards the estate investors. However, the simple model
of this paper also shows that they should be very careful not to increase it any further, if
the wish to avoid house price bubbles. For example, MACRS, with its ve year allowance,
would open the door to rational house price bubbles of expected duration of about 8 years
and 8 months.
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3 Conclusion
This paper has shown that in a rational world in which real estate price bubbles would not
exist, governments could induce the emergence of house price bubbles by allowing estate
owners to scally depreciate their real estates at a rate higher than the actual physical
depreciation of the estate. Moreover, the very existence of such house price bubbles allows
for a probability of their crash. Finally, the crash probability is increasing in the scal
depreciation rate.
A very simple rule of thumb numerical excercise has shown that the standard scal
accounting practice of allowing for a 5% annual depreciation rate is the most generous scal
depreciation able to safeguard the economies from house price bubbles.
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